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Disinformation surrounding DRC-Rwanda relations has weakened the diplomatic and public standing of both countries
Featured image from DRC media, created using screenshots from ACP's YouTube channel
This post is part of Global Voices’ October 2026 Spotlight series, “Big Tech and Authoritarianism.” In this Spotlight, we explore how Big Tech facilitates and hinders authoritarian governments and practices, and how these choices influence the Global South. You can support this coverage by donating here.
In September 2026, Anthropic, an artificial intelligence (AI) development and research company, exposed a network of fake news sites targeting the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The investigation revealed that large-scale, AI-powered disinformation campaigns have emerged at a time of conflict when trust in the news is already at an all-time low and resources are severely limited.
This revelation rang alarm bells for African media watchdogs. The network coordinated around 70 AI-powered fake news sites and generated at least 318 articles on the eastern DRC conflict, relations with Rwanda, and contested mineral resources. The operation was highly robust.
On X, coordinated accounts amplified content from the AI-run sites, mimicking legitimate media outlets and rewriting articles for different audiences.
According to Anthropic’s report, the LKM Company, a French advertising agency serving clients with strong interests in the DRC-Rwanda conflict, was behind it all. They found no evidence of direct government involvement.
When Global Voices approached Hobab Watukalusu, a fact-checker, editor, and head of the training and research department at Soma Média Lab in Kinshasa, the capital of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, he shared:
He added that local journalists on the front lines are struggling to keep up as new technologies make it easier than ever to facilitate massive disinformation campaigns.
DR Congolese fact-checkers face a litany of obstacles in slowing disinformation flows across regions. Hobab outlines the fundamental constraints:
In the DRC, where journalists are already overwhelmed by covering an active military conflict, analyzing potential industrial-scale, AI-generated content is virtually impossible.
Joël Kaseso, another journalist covering disinformation narratives, told Global Voices:
Kaseso has also identified a simple but critical methodology that most journalists use to navigate this situation: analyzing the author’s intentions, the source’s profile (anonymous accounts versus identifiable influencers), and amplification patterns. However, this requires time and tools that many newsrooms don’t have.
The challenge extends far beyond detection. Hobab explains:
The resource gap is pivotal. It ultimately determines who controls the narrative during a crisis. While an AI-powered operation can generate 318 targeted articles in just a few days, a genuine newsroom must verify its sources, contact those involved, corroborate images, and provide context, all of which can take weeks.
The Anthropic report revealed another major threat jeopardizing investigative reporting in the DRC. Accusations of disinformation can themselves become weapons of censorship. Hobab points out a troubling precedent:
In September 2023, DR Congolese journalist Stanis Bujakera was arrested for spreading false information. In March 2024, the court subsequently sentenced him, raising serious concerns among press freedom organizations.
The current state of affairs complicates fact-checkers’ work and could stifle journalists’ efforts. When asked how media personnel can combat genuine disinformation without giving governments a new tool to silence their critics, Hobab stated:
Although Hobab remained cautious about claiming direct causality, he noted that the 318 AI-generated articles had a tangible impact on the region. As Joël Kaseso put it:
Heavy exposure to biased, manipulated, and highly emotional narratives, often framed as “true patriotism,” makes it harder to distinguish verified information from propaganda. Hobab also points out specific political consequences: measures affecting universities in AFC/M23-controlled areas and restrictions that Burundi announced on entry from M23-controlled areas.
In Rwanda, the situation seems much the same. Manzi (a pseudonym), a Rwandan journalist, explains:
Despite the challenges, DR Congolese journalists are actively working to build effective resistance techniques. Hobab mentioned Kinshasa News Lab, a newly formed space where fact-checkers, media professionals, and media literacy educators meet to discuss the causes of disinformation and possible solutions. Joël Kaseso also noted partnerships producing measurable results:
He also lists freely available tools that do not require any expensive licenses: InVID We Verify, Google Image Search, Yandex, Hive Moderation, and Zero GPT to detect AI-generated content.
Training journalists in fact-checking has enabled them to critically analyze online content and distinguish fact from fiction. However, according to Hobab, this training remains insufficient. He warns:
Instrumentalizing fact-checking poses yet another threat. Fact-checking is the ultimate safeguard for verified information. However, if it instead becomes a tool in the political, economic, or institutional sphere, it loses much of its credibility.
Source: Global Voices ↗
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Last checked 25 Oct 2026, 7:14 pm IST · Coverage & methodology